

# Managing Supply Chain Risk

## *Using NIST Standards and Guidelines*

ICT Supply Chain Risk Management Workshop

October 15, 2012

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# The Current Landscape.

*It's a dangerous world when it comes to cyber...*

# Conventional Threats

- *What do we worry about?*
  - Hostile cyber attacks
  - Natural disasters
  - Structural failures
  - Human errors of omission or commission



# Advanced Persistent Threat

*An adversary that —*

- Possesses significant levels of expertise / resources.
- Creates opportunities to achieve its objectives by using multiple attack vectors (e.g., cyber, physical, deception).
- Establishes footholds within IT infrastructure of targeted organizations:
  - To exfiltrate information.
  - Undermine / impede critical aspects of a mission, program, or organization.
  - Position itself to carry out these objectives in the future.

# Unconventional Threats

*What should we worry about?*



*Complexity*


*Connectivity*



*Culture*

*The federal cyber security strategy...*

# Build It Right, Then Continuously Monitor



# The First Front.

*What we have accomplished...*

# Joint Task Force Transformation Initiative

- In 2012, completed development of comprehensive security guidelines that can be adopted by all federal agencies including the national security community.
- Flexible and extensible tool box includes:
  - *An enterprise-wide risk management process.*
  - *State-of-the-practice, comprehensive, security controls.*
  - *Risk management framework.*
  - *Risk assessment process.*
  - *Security control assessment procedures.*




# Unified Information Security Framework

## Generalized Model

**Unique  
Information  
Security  
Requirements**

**The “Delta”**

**Common  
Information  
Security  
Requirements**



National security and non national security information systems

# Key Publications in the Framework


- **NIST Special Publication 800-39**  
*Managing Information Security Risk:  
Organization, Mission, and Information System View*
- **NIST Special Publication 800-30**  
*Guide for Conducting Risk Assessments*
- **NIST Special Publication 800-37**  
*Applying the Risk Management Framework  
to Federal Information Systems*
- **NIST Special Publication 800-53**  
*Recommended Security Controls for Federal  
Information Systems and Organizations*
- **NIST Special Publication 800-53A**  
*Guide for Assessing the Security Controls  
in Federal Information Systems and Organizations*



# The Second Front.

*What we need to accomplish...*

We need to build our security programs like NASA builds space shuttles—using the *integrated project team* concept.



# A New Approach for Information Security

- Work directly with mission/business owners and program managers.
- Bring all stakeholders to the table with a vested interest in the success or outcome of the mission or business function.
- Consider information security requirements as mainstream functional requirements.
- Conduct security trade-off analyses with regard to cost, schedule, and performance requirements.
- Implement enforceable metrics for key officials.

# What can we do to change course?

*Simplify, Specialize, and Integrate...*

# Increasing Strength of IT Infrastructure

- Simplify.
  - Reduce and manage *complexity* of IT infrastructure.
  - Use enterprise architecture to streamline the IT infrastructure; *standardize, optimize, consolidate* IT assets.
- Specialize.
  - Use guidance in SP 800-53, Rev 4 to *customize security plans* to support specific missions/business functions, environments of operation, and technologies.
  - Develop effective *monitoring strategies* linked to specialized security plans.

# Increasing Strength of IT Infrastructure

- Integrate.
  - Build information security requirements and controls into mainstream organizational processes including:
    - *Enterprise Architecture.*
    - *Systems Engineering.*
    - *System Development Life Cycle.*
    - *Acquisition.*
  - Eliminate information security programs and practices as stovepipes within organizations.
  - Ensure information security decisions are risk-based and part of routine *cost*, *schedule*, and *performance* tradeoffs.



# Complexity.

*Ground zero for our current problems...*

Information security and privacy,  
traditional societal values, are  
at greater risk today due to the  
ever increasing size of our  
*digital footprint...*



If we can't understand it –  
*we can't protect it...*

# Enterprise Architecture

- Consolidation.
- Optimization.
- Standardization.



And the integration of information security requirements...


- Reduces the size and complexity of IT infrastructures, promotes good information security and privacy, and can potentially lower costs (significantly) for organizations.

Think strategic.  
*Execute tactical...*

# STRATEGIC RISK FOCUS


Communicating and sharing risk-related information from the **strategic** to **tactical** level.

Communicating and sharing risk-related information from the **tactical** to **strategic** level.



# TACTICAL RISK FOCUS

# Risk Management Framework



# Defense-in-Depth



## Links in the Security and Privacy Chain: Security and Privacy Controls

- ✓ Risk assessment
- ✓ Security planning, policies, procedures
- ✓ Configuration management and control
- ✓ Contingency planning
- ✓ Incident response planning
- ✓ Security awareness and training
- ✓ Security in acquisitions
- ✓ Physical and personnel security
- ✓ Security assessments and authorization
- ✓ Continuous monitoring
- ✓ Privacy protection
- ✓ Access control mechanisms
- ✓ Identification & authentication mechanisms (Biometrics, tokens, passwords)
- ✓ Audit mechanisms
- ✓ Encryption mechanisms
- ✓ Boundary and network protection devices (Firewalls, guards, routers, gateways)
- ✓ Intrusion protection/detection systems
- ✓ Security configuration settings
- ✓ Anti-viral, anti-spyware, anti-spam software
- ✓ Smart cards

*Adversaries attack the weakest link...where is yours?*



# Defense In Depth is a Good Strategy

*Until it fails...then what?*


# Resilience.

*The only way to go for critical missions  
and information systems...*

# Functionality and Assurance.

*They ride together...*

FUNCTIONALITY



What is observable in front of the wall.

What is observable behind the wall.


ASSURANCE



# Assurance.

*You don't need it until you need it...*

# Assurance and Trustworthiness



And after we build it right.

*What next?*

# Continuous Monitoring

- Determine effectiveness of risk responses.
- Identify changes to information systems and environments of operation.
- Verify compliance to federal legislation, Executive Orders, directives, policies, standards, and guidelines.

Bottom Line: Increase situational awareness to help determine risk to organizational operations and assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation.

And until we build it right.  
*What should we do?*



# Important Stop-Gap Actions

- For high-end adversaries launching sophisticated and well-coordinated cyber attacks targeting: U.S. critical infrastructure; federal mission-essential functions and systems; and private sector industries—
  - ✓ Develop, implement, and exercise robust contingency plans to support full scale continuity of operations;
  - ✓ Implement continuous monitoring programs; and



# Special Publication 800-53, Revision 4.

*Big changes on the way...*

# Major Drivers for Update

- Current threat landscape.
- Empirical data obtained from cyber attacks.
- Gaps in coverage in current security control catalog.
- Insufficient attention to security assurance and trustworthiness.
- Need for additional tailoring guidance for specific missions, technologies, and environments of operation.

# Gap Areas Addressed

- Insider threat
- Application security
- *Supply chain risk* 
- Security assurance and trustworthy systems
- Mobile and cloud computing technologies
- Advanced persistent threat
- Tailoring guidance and overlays
- Privacy

# SP 800-53 Supply Chain Control

- FAMILY: SYSTEM AND SERVICES ACQUISITION  
SA-12 Supply Chain Protection

Control: The organization protects against supply chain threats by employing [*Assignment: organization-defined security safeguards*] as part of a comprehensive, defense-in-breadth information security strategy.

# Supply Chain Control Enhancements

- SA-12      SUPPLY CHAIN PROTECTION
  - *ACQUISITION STRATEGIES / TOOLS / METHODS*
  - *SUPPLIER REVIEWS*
  - *LIMITATION OF HARM*
  - *ASSESSMENTS PRIOR TO SELECTION / ACCEPTANCE / UPDATE*
  - *USE OF ALL-SOURCE INTELLIGENCE*
  - *UNAUTHORIZED MODIFICATIONS*

# Supply Chain Control Enhancements

- SA-12      SUPPLY CHAIN PROTECTION
  - *VALIDATE AS GENUINE AND NOT ALTERED*
  - *PENETRATION TESTING / ANALYSIS OF SUPPLY CHAIN ELEMENTS*
  - *INTER-ORGANIZATIONAL AGREEMENTS*
  - *CRITICAL INFORMATION SYSTEM COMPONENTS*
  - *PROCESSES TO ADDRESS WEAKNESSES OR DEFICIENCIES*

# Potential Supply Chain Changes

*Under Consideration for SP 800-53, Revision 4*

- Additional enhancements and supplemental guidance for SA-12 and supply chain-related controls—
  - Identification of critical functions and components.
  - Identity and traceability of supply chain elements.





Adversaries are not ten feet tall.

*They have work factors and attack sequences  
that can be disrupted...*



# Managing supply chain risk.

*Doesn't mean fixing everything...*



- ✓ Frame
- ✓ Assess
- ✓ Respond
- ✓ Monitor





# Risk Tolerance.

*How you know when to stop deploying  
security controls...*



# On The Horizon

- NIST Special Publication 800-53, Revision 4.  
*Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems and Organizations*
- NIST Special Publication 800-53A, Revision 2.  
*Guide for Assessing the Security Controls in Federal Information Systems and Organizations*
- NIST Special Publication 800-160.   
*Security Engineering Guideline*
- NIST Special Publication 800-161   
*Supply Chain Practices for Federal Information Systems*

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